Tag Archives: pandemic

China MOA: ASF Returns To Tianjin

“Because of the concern over ASF, USDA recently reviewed and further strengthened its longstanding stringent protections against the spread of the disease.These include:

Collaborating with states, industry and producers to ensure everyone follows on-farm biosecurity and best practices (including for garbage feeding in states where that is allowed);
Restricting imports of pork and pork products from affected countries; and
Working with CBP staff at ports of entry to increase passenger and baggage screening for prohibited products from affected countries.”

ASF%2BCHINA%2BMap.png

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A little over 6 weeks ago China’s MOA announced the first African Swine Fever outbreak in Tianjin (one of the 9 National Central Cities of China), located about 100km from Beijing.

While most of China’s ASF action during the month of November has been relegated to the Southern provinces, today their MOA announces a second outbreak in Tianjin.

Today’s report comes just one week after the announcement that ASF had finally reached Beijing, and brings China’s total to at least 80 outbreaks since August 1st (cite).

The Ninghe District of Tianjin Province has detected the epidemic situation of African swine fever

Date: 2018-11-30 10:17 Author: Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Press Office 


The Information Office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs was released on November 29, and the Ninghe District of Tianjin Province detected the African swine fever epidemic.

At 21:00 on November 29, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs received a report from the China Animal Disease Prevention and Control Center and was diagnosed by the China Center for Animal Health and Epidemiology (National Center for Animal Disease Research). 

A farm in Ninghe District of Tianjin was found in Africa. Pig plague. Up to now, the farm has 361 pigs and 67 deaths.

Immediately after the outbreak, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs sent a steering group to the local area. The local government has started the emergency response mechanism as required, and adopted measures such as blockade, culling, harmless treatment, disinfection, etc., to treat all the sick and culled pigs harmlessly. At the same time, all pigs and their products are prohibited from being transferred out of the blockade, and pigs are prohibited from being transported into the blockade. At present, the above measures have been implemented.

ASF has never been reported in North America, but the potential exists for its importation. The USDA has released a new African Swine Fever Factsheet that discusses their preparations for a possible introduction of the virus into this country.

(Excerpt)

Keeping ASF Out

Because of the concern over ASF, USDA recently reviewed and further strengthened its longstanding stringent protections against the spread of the disease.These include:

  • Collaborating with states, industry and producers to ensure everyone follows on-farm biosecurity and best practices (including for garbage feeding in states where that is allowed);
  • Restricting imports of pork and pork products from affected countries; and
  • Working with CBP staff at ports of entry to increase passenger and baggage screening for prohibited products from affected countries.

While ASF doesn’t pose a direct health risk to humans, it is a serious threat to the pig industry – and with no vaccine available – the only way to control it is to cull all of the pigs that may have been exposed.

Meanwhile, ASF continues to make inroads in Europe, and further spread there and in Asia seems inevitable (see FAO: African swine fever (ASF) threatens to spread from China to other Asian countries).

An outbreak of leptospirosis among kayakers in Brittany, North-West France, 2016

In September 2016, a cluster of seven kayakers with clinical symptoms of leptospirosis with onset since July 2016 was reported to French health authorities. Human and animal investigations were undertaken to describe the outbreak, identify the likely place and source of infection and implement necessary control measures. We identified 103 patients with clinical symptoms of leptospirosis between 1 June and 31 October 2016 who lived in the Ille-et-Vilaine district in Brittany. Of these, 14 (including the original seven) reported contacts with the river Vilaine during the incubation period and were defined as outbreak cases: eight were confirmed by serology tests or PCR and six were probable without a laboratory confirmation for leptospirosis. All 14 cases were kayakers. Three distinct contamination sites were identified on a 30 km stretch of the river Vilaine. Nine cases reported having skin wounds while kayaking. None were vaccinated against leptospirosis. The outbreak was attributed to Leptospira kirschneri serogroup Grippotyphosa. Animal investigations did not allow identifying the possible reservoir. Leptospirosis outbreaks associated with freshwater sports are rare in temperate climates. The prevention of such outbreaks requires control of potential animal reservoirs in zones such as the Vilaine valley and that kayakers adopt the recommended individual prevention measures.

EID Journal: Comparison of 2016–17 and Previous Epizootics of HPAI H5 In Europe

https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/24/12/17-1860-f5

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The record setting 2016-17 epizootic of HPAI H5 was not the first incursion of a Guangdong lineage HPAI H5 virus into Europe, but it was the largest, and the most damaging.

And almost from the beginning, it was obvious `something‘ was very different about the 2016 virus (see Nov 14th, 2016’s Europe: Unusual Mortality Among WIld Birds From H5N8).

In early January of 2017 we learned that the H5N8 virus had reassorted – likely over the previous summer somewhere in Russia or Mongolia  – producing a new, more virulent virus (see EID Journal: Reassorted HPAI H5N8 Clade 2.3.4.4. – Germany 2016).

About the same time, we were also starting to see spin offs of new HPAI subtypes via reassortment (see HPAI H5N5 Detected In German Poultry Operation).

Avian%2BReassortment.JPG

In addition to being far more virulent in wild and migratory birds, this reassorted virus also displayed the ability to infect a much wider range of birds (see ESA 2017 list of 78 species).

Instead of burning itself out quickly – as we’d seen with previous epizootics in both Europe and North America (see PNAS: The Enigma Of Disappearing HPAI H5 In North American Migratory Waterfowl) – this new H5N8 virus  showed remarkable persistence and geographic spread – making it’s way into the Middle East, West and Central Africa that same winter, and even the Southern Hemisphere the following spring.

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While we’ve seen a handful of analyses ascribing unusual qualities to this 2016 reassorted HPAI H5 virus, the December edition of the CDC’s EID Journal has the most in depth look to date at how Europe’s 20016/17 epizootic differed from previous incursions of the virus. 

It’s a long, very detailed, review that points out the 2016/17 epizootic among poultry was 5 times bigger than the 2005/06 outbreak of HPAI H5N1, and 80 times bigger than the 2014/15 initial arrival of HPAI H5N8.  

I’ve only included a few brief snippets from the full review, so follow the link to read it in its entirety.

Volume 24, Number 12—December 2018
Research 

Comparison of 2016–17 and Previous Epizootics of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5 Guangdong Lineage in Europe

Pablo Alarcon1, Adam Brouwer1email.gif , Divya Venkatesh, Daisy Duncan, Chrysostomos I. Dovas, George Georgiades, Isabella Monne, Alice Fusaro, Adam Dan, Krzysztof Śmietanka, Vassilios Ragias, Andrew C. Breed, Taxiarchis Chassalevris, Gabriela Goujgoulova, Charlotte Kristiane Hjulsager, Eoin Ryan, Azucena Sánchez, Eric Niqueux, Niina Tammiranta, Siamak Zohari, David A. Stroud, Vladimir Savić, Nicola S. Lewis, and Ian H. Brown

Abstract

We analyzed the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5 epizootic of 2016–17 in Europe by epidemiologic and genetic characteristics and compared it with 2 previous epizootics caused by the same H5 Guangdong lineage. The 2016–17 epizootic was the largest in Europe by number of countries and farms affected and greatest diversity of wild birds infected.

We observed significant differences among the 3 epizootics regarding region affected, epidemic curve, seasonality, and outbreak duration, making it difficult to predict future HPAI epizootics. However, we know that in 2005–06 and 2016–17 the initial peak of wild bird detections preceded the peak of poultry outbreaks within Europe.
Phylogenetic analysis of 2016–17 viruses indicates 2 main pathways into Europe. Our findings highlight the need for global surveillance of viral changes to inform disease preparedness, detection, and control.

(SNIP)

Epizootic Size

In 2016–17, a total of 1,108 poultry outbreaks were reported in 21 countries in Europe. Extensive farm-to-farm spread, predominantly in ducks, seemed apparent in France, which had > 400 farms affected, and Hungary, with > 200 farms infected (19). Conversely, in 2005–06, a total of 230 poultry outbreaks occurred in 6 countries, mostly located in Romania (86%) and Hungary (13%). In 2014–15, only 13 poultry outbreaks were reported in 5 countries. The estimated number of poultry culled was 8 times higher in 2016–17 than in 2005–06 (Table 1).

The number of wild bird detections was substantially different between epizootics: 1,559 incidents in 27 countries in 2016–17, 487 in 18 countries in 2005–06, and only 5 in 3 countries in 2014–15. Almost half of the wild bird incidents reported in all 3 epizootics were in Germany.

Wild Birds Species and Mass Mortality Events

A total of 49 different wild bird species were reported infected with HPAI H5 virus of the Guangdong lineage in 2016–17, 28 in 2005–06, and 6 in 2014–15 (Table 2,3). Swans (Cygnus spp.), particularly mute swans (Cygnus olor), were the most frequent species infected in 2005–06 (41% of all wild birds) and 2016–17 (20% of all wild birds).

Ducks were the second most common type of wild birds infected. In 2005–06 and 2016–17, tufted duck (Aythya fuligula) was the most frequent duck species detected positive (5% of all wild birds). In 2005–06, a total of 28 (6%) mass mortality events (> 5 birds dead in 1 location) were reported, whereas 112 (7%) mass mortality events were reported in 2016–17; none were reported in 2014–15 (Technical Appendix Figure 2). The number of wild birds found dead by incident was significantly different between epizootics (p < 0.001 by Mann-Whitney U test).

(SNIP)

DISCUSSION

The 2016–17 epizootic of HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses in Europe has 5 times more outbreaks in poultry than observed in the H5 clade 2.2 epizootic in 2005–06 and 80 times more than in the H5 clade 2.3.4.4 epizootic in 2014–15.

This study highlights the unprecedented magnitude of the 2016–17 HPAI H5 epizootic in Europe, in terms of size (both number of poultry outbreaks and wild bird incidents), geographic spread, speed of incidents/outbreaks, and diversity of wild bird species reported infected. As a result, the economic impact is many times higher for 2016–17, which resulted in an >8-fold increase in poultry that died or were culled.

        (SNIP)

The extent of the 2016–17 H5 epizootic indicates an urgent need to reappraise the effectiveness of surveillance strategies in both wild and domestic birds and to monitor key populations for emergence of viral variants. The differences we observed in the 3 epizootics illustrate the difficulty of predicting HPAI epizootics. However, the temporal peak of wild bird detections preceding the peak of poultry outbreaks at the EU level highlighted the utility of surveillance in wild birds, as observed in other studies (29).

The spatial corridors of HPAI we identified may provide the basis for an increase in targeted surveillance to improve system sensitivity. Although the H5N8, H5N5, and H5N6 European-reassortant viruses have not been shown to infect humans and remain avian influenza–like strains with no evidence of key mammalian adaptation markers (27), their genetic volatility represents a potential threat that requires continuous monitoring and surveillance of virus incidence and genetics to continue to protect public safety.

Dr. Alarcon is a lecturer in animal health economics at the Royal Veterinary College, London. During this study, he was a veterinary epidemiologist at the Animal and Plant Health Agency, United Kingdom, where his role and research focused on the analysis of avian influenza surveillance data in Europe.

(Continue . . . )

While Europe’s HPAI H5N8 was largely supplanted over the winter of 2017/18 by a less virulent HPAI H5N6, it continues to cause outbreaks – and interact with other avian viruses –  in Russia, Bulgaria, the Middle East, and Africa.    

Despite Europe’s current lull in activity, HPAI H5’s persistence – and its proclivity for reassorting with other viruses – means we can’t know what the future holds for this lineage, or its descendants.

But if the recent past is any guide, with the rapid emergence and evolution of avian flu viruses over the the past decade, we may not have to wait long to find out. 
 

WHO Update & Risk Assessment On Ebola In the DRC

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WHO Ebola Dashboard

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The World Health Organization has released their latest situation report and Risk Assessment on the Ebola outbreak which has been going in the eastern part of the DRC – very near the border with Uganda – since August 1st.

Confirmed and probable cases are approaching 400, and while that pales compared to the 28,000+ incurred during the 2014 West African epidemic, it is now the third largest on record and will likely soon take the spot. 

Complicating matters greatly is the lack of government control of the region, attacks on healthcare personnel, and a relatively porous border with neighboring countries – all of which could lead to a wider regional spread of the virus.

I’ve only posted some excerpts from a much longer update, so follow the link to read it in its entirety.

Ebola virus disease – Democratic Republic of the Congo

Disease outbreak news: Update
22 November 2018

Containing the ongoing Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a complex and challenging task but WHO remains confident that the outbreak can be successfully contained in collaboration with the Ministry of Health (MoH) and partners.

On 16 November 2018, an armed group attacked the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) base in the Boikene District, in the city of Beni, close to the UN Ebola response residences. Response operations in Beni were briefly paused but all activities, including vaccination, resumed by 18 November. WHO condemns the attacks on peacekeepers who are integral to the ongoing efforts to manage the EVD outbreak. WHO will continue to evaluate the situation and risks involved, and remain vigilant about measures to protect responders and civilians.

Health centres have been identified as a source of disease transmission. Medications administered via injections were a notable cause of infection. Current efforts are focused on improving infection prevention and control (IPC) measures, including providing water and products for cleaning, training health providers at informal health centres and encouraging the provisision of medications which do not require injections.

During the reporting period (14 – 20 November), 36 new confirmed EVD cases were reported from Beni, Mutwanga, Kalunguta, Butembo, Katwa and Oicha while seven probable cases were reported from Kalunguta. Seven of the new cases were newborn babies and infants aged less than two years, six were children aged between 2 – 17 years and one case was a pregnant woman. Five health workers from Beni and Katwa were among the newly infected; 39 health workers have been infected to date. Ten additional survivors were discharged from Ebola treatment centres (ETCs) in Beni (six) and Butembo (four) and reintegrated into their communities; 113 patients have recovered to date.

As of 20 November, 386 EVD cases (339 confirmed and 47 probable), including 219 deaths (172 confirmed and 47 probable)1, have been reported in 11 health zones in North Kivu Province and three health zones in Ituri Province (Figure 1). The overall trends in weekly case incidence reflect continued community transmission in several cities and villages in North Kivu (Figure 2). Given the expected delays in case detection and ongoing data reconciliation activities, trends, especially in the most recent weeks, must be interpreted cautiously.

The risk of the outbreak spreading to other provinces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as to neighbouring countries, remains very high. Over the course of the past week, alerts have been reported from Uganda and Zambia; EVD has been ruled out for all alerts to date. 

http://www.who.int/csr/don/22-november-2018-ebola-drc/en/
http://www.who.int/csr/don/22-november-2018-ebola-drc/en/

 (SNIP)


WHO risk assessment

This outbreak of EVD is affecting north-eastern provinces of the country, which border Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan. Potential risk factors for transmission of EVD at the national and regional levels include: transportation links between the affected areas, the rest of the country, and neighbouring countries; the internal displacement of populations; and the displacement of Congolese refugees to neighbouring countries. The country is concurrently experiencing other epidemics (e.g. cholera, vaccine-derived poliomyelitis, malaria), and a long-term humanitarian crisis. Additionally, the security situation in North Kivu and Ituri at times limits the implementation of response activities. WHO’s risk assessment for the outbreak is currently very high at the national and regional levels; the global risk level remains low. WHO continues to advise against any restriction of travel to, and trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo based on currently available information.

As the risk of national and regional spread is very high, it is important for neighbouring provinces and countries to enhance surveillance and preparedness activities. The International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) Emergency Committee has advised that failing to intensify these preparedness and surveillance activities would lead to worsening conditions and further spread. WHO will continue to work with neighbouring countries and partners to ensure that health authorities are alerted and are operationally prepared to respond.

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